Post-Remediation Report on DynexSolve 2.3 Driver Stack Exploit

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of a recently identified and remediated vulnerability that temporarily affected the DNX ecosystem: the DynexSolve 2.3 GPU Driver Stack Exploit (referred to as the “DS_2.3 exploit”). The exploit posed risks to the integrity, availability, and security of the DNX network. Specifically, it enabled the artificial inflation of reported hash rates, thereby compromising the fairness, efficiency, and reward distribution mechanisms of the system. While the exploit required a degree of technical sophistication to execute, it was subsequently shared among a small group of users, amplifying its potential impact.

This report is intended to transparently inform the DNX community, present the technical specifics of the vulnerability, evaluate its impact, and outline the mitigation measures that have been implemented. It is being published now — after the deployment of DynexSolve 2.4 and the full resolution of the vulnerability — in order to ensure that no additional risk is introduced through premature disclosure.

Key findings

• The DS_2.3 exploit affected both OneZeroMiner and BZMiner in an effort to bypass critical computational components of the DynexSolve Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) algorithm, resulting in inflated rewards for miners who took advantage of this exploit.
• The security test runs that were performed on the network at the time, confirmed that these units were valid workers according to the automatic security tests done on mallob level, yet they failed to provide valid solutions to jobs, due to the way the Driver Stack was exploited.
• The Driver Stack Exploit, identified by uhlik (Discord User), affects the driver stack for a vGPU (Virtual GPU), potentially allowing attackers to gain access to pseudo-generation of a GPU that is non-existent.
• Immediate actions were required, so the team proceeded with DynexSolve 2.4 to patch these vulnerabilities, followed by updates of the affected software and enhanced security practices to prevent further exploitation in the future.
• Dynex’s innovative approach has positioned it as a leader in the PoUW space, but its complexity also introduces unique security challenges, as evidenced by the vulnerabilities discussed in this report. This report is structured to provide a technical overview, impact assessment, mitigation strategies, and recommendations for the DNX community.

Section 1: The DynexSolve 2.3 (DS_2.3) Exploit

1.1 Overview of the DS_2.3 Exploit

The DS_2.3 exploit refers to a vulnerability in the DynexSolve algorithm that allowed certain mining software to artificially inflate reported hash rates, thereby increasing mining rewards without performing the full scope of required computations. This exploit was first hinted by uhlik (Discord User) in September 2024, however due to the nature of the exploits being used, the team didn’t initially evaluate the severity of the threat, as it wasn’t failing automatic security checks on mallob. It was only after December 2024, when a heavy test was conducted, that the Dynex Team was able to identify that the PoUW part was in fact coming back as only partially valid and thus had enough evidence to acknowledge that the exploit was real.

The exploit primarily affected the PoW component of the DynexSolve algorithm. By bypassing or partially solving this component, the offending software -specifically OneZeroMiner and BZMiner- enabled miners to report inflated hash rates, unfairly skewing the reward distribution on the network. This not only compromised the fairness of the mining process but also undermined the integrity of Dynex’s PoUW model, which relies on accurate computational contributions. At this point, the whole Dynex Developers team would like to extend their gratitude to uhlik (Discord User) for identifying this new (and up to this point unheard of) exploit for DNX.

1.2 Technical Details

The DynexSolve algorithm requires miners to perform computations in both the ML and SAT components to generate valid proofs of work. The DS_2.3 exploit allowed miners to:

• Inflate Reported Hash Rates. By reporting artificially high hash rates, miners using the exploit received disproportionately high rewards, estimated to be 50–60% higher than legitimate miners.
• Exploit Implementation Gaps. The vulnerability stemmed from a driver stack exploit that allowed a vGPU to be generated and bound to a “fake” emulated GPU. This allowed small validations within the PoUW to pass validation checksums, due to the ability for basic computation to be funnelled through to the CPU.

The Dynex team has since acknowledged the issue and has implemented fixes, including:

• Algorithm Upgrade (DynexSolve 2.4);
• Deprecating old and vulnerable miners; and
• Deeper and more robust validation checksums, to allow a further hardening of the PoUW mechanism.

1.3 Impact Assessment

The DS_2.3 exploit had consequences for the DNX ecosystem:

• Fairness of Mining Rewards. Legitimate miners were disadvantaged, receiving lower rewards relative to their computational contributions.
• Network Integrity. The exploit undermined trust in DNX’s PoUW model, raising concerns about the reliability of its computational outputs for scientific and industrial applications.
• Economic Impact. The artificial inflation of hashrates led to over 50% reduction in the profitability of mining DNX, impacting its performance and popularity among the mining industry.
• Reputation Risk. The identified vulnerability prompted some members of the community to question DNX’s readiness for production deployment. Concerns were raised regarding the project’s ability to address complex technical challenges in a timely and effective manner..

1.4 Response and Mitigation

The Dynex Developers had taken several steps to address the DS_2.3 exploit:

• Algorithm Update. A fix to the DynexSolve algorithm, a new entanglement validation was introduced in DynexSolve 2.4. This update has already been rolled out across all valid DNX mining pools that are currently in operation. These fixes around the entanglement validation are logically not publicly released — due to security concerns. The Dynex Developers are confident however that the new entanglement validation successfully removes any “grey” area of the computational side of the PoUW. The Dynex team would like to extend a special thank you to EhhsanD, developer of the OZM miner, for his invaluable contributions to the recent algorithm update. His work played a key role in its successful implementation.
• Software Restrictions. Currently OneZeroMiner is working (NVIDIA). Unfortunately, BZMiner (AMD/NVIDIA) is unable to register to the DNX network for the moment, however this is being worked on by the miner software developer at the time of the report and will hopefully be ready soon.
• Alternative Software. The Dynex Developers are collaborating with both OneZeroMiner and BZMiner developers to further understand possible better practices, long term security enhancements and overall network stability.
• Community Communication. The Dynex Developers have issued public statements via Discord and Social Media, the team also announced that the report would be made “top priority” along with being a transparent document (whether being positive or negative).

1.5 Critical Analysis

While Dynex Developers’ response demonstrates a commitment to addressing the issue, several concerns remain:

• Fairness of Temporary Measures. Allowing the offending software to remain in use, even temporarily, raises ethical questions about fairness, as it permitted exploiters to continue benefiting at the expense of legitimate miners.
• Long-Term Security. The DS_2.3 exploit highlighted broader concerns about the complexity of PoUW algorithms in general and the need for ongoing rigorous security audits to prevent similar issues in the future.

Section 2: vGPU Driver Stack Exploit

2.1 Overview of the Driver Stack Exploit

A critical vulnerability was identified by uhlik (Discord User), that allowed this exploit — in conjunction with the DS_2.3 one, to take advantage of a vGPU (Virtual GPU) workaround that would allow the vGPU to emulate and bind directly with the CPU rather than a Physical GPU.

This exploit is particularly concerning because it operates at the driver level, granting attackers the ability to instruct as many vGPUs as needed (each CPU Core, could act as a vGPU). The vulnerability was disclosed and a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit was submitted to the Dynex Team to validate the exploit as legit and working. As of this report, the exploit of vGPU driver stack has been closed and DynexSolve’s PoUW mechanism has been further refined with deeper security than ever before.

2.2 Technical Details

The Driver Stack Exploit targets a method to bind a vGPU to a CPU Core and validate on the Dynex network as a full GPU.

• Attack Vector: The exploit can be triggered by using a vGPU to solve solutions on a CPU and not a physical GPU, whereas combined with the hash boost from DS_2.3 exploit, the user could gain an advantage on the PoUW rewards system.
• Affected Systems: The vulnerability affected both OneZeroMiner and BZMiner as (from the mining software’s perspective) these are physical GPUs doing PoUW solutions in a valid way for the Dynex Network.

The exploit’s severity is compounded by the fact that the user would need a good understanding around how this is achieved along with modifications to not trigger any of Dynex’s Security measurements. The new DynexSolve 2.4 added a brand-new validation layer and also added a new check for a specific fingerprint unique to vGPUs.

2.3 Impact Assessment

• System Compromise: Attackers could use this exploit not only on DNX but most PoW/PoUW networks, allowing the attacker to gain more mining rewards due to their inflated hashrate from non-existent GPU(s).
• Network Security: Compromised systems could be used to launch further attacks on a given network, such as Botnet style mining, where exploited machines are using vGPUs and CPUs rather than actually investing in hardware for the network security and/or Proof of Useful Work (PoUW).
• Reputational Damage: The presence of a vulnerability in DynexSolve’s software stack raises concerns about the project’s security practices, potentially deterring adoption by enterprise users, scientific collaborators and the wider B2B and B2C industries that are currently investing into Quantum solutions.

The severity of this vulnerability is rated as 9/10 due to its ability to not only reduce the security of a network, but create an imbalance in the miner rewards being issued out to all miners working on the DNX Network. This has also caused a high degree of selling pressure, as the user was/is most likely selling daily to get as much profit out of the network as they possibly can.

Screenshot showing the exploit using BZminer, process is similar with OZM

Screenshot showing the exploits using BZminer, process is similar with OZM

2.4 Response and Mitigation

• Patch Development: A patch for the vulnerability was developed by the Dynex team, in conjunction with both OneZeroMiner and BZminer developers and released on 23rd Feb 2025. All mining pools were instructed to upgrade to the latest DynexSolve 2.4 (internal version: 48.20).
• Community Engagement: The Dynex Developers have engaged the community through Discord, providing updates and soliciting feedback on the issue.

2.5 Critical Analysis

The Driver Stack Exploit highlights systemic issues in the security of DynexSolve’s software stack:

• Kernel-Level Risks. Operating at the kernel level inherently increases the severity of vulnerabilities, as exploits can bypass ecosystem security measures. This raises questions about how the DynexSolve PoUW mechanism is implemented and to what degree Dynex Developers have to oversee the network on a day-to-day basis.
• Response Time. The time between discovery and patch deployment was around 45 days. While the team acknowledges that this time was not ideal as it could expose DNX and its Clients to unnecessary risk, it has to be highlighted that truly understanding the mechanisms being employed and tracking down all the wallets involved, took a lot of time and effort to validate.

Section 3: Broader Implications and Recommendations

3.1 Broader Implications

The DS_2.3 Driver Stack Exploit underscore several systemic challenges in the DNX ecosystem and the broader blockchain security landscape:

• Complexity vs. Security. The innovative PoUW model, while groundbreaking, introduces significant complexity that increases the attack surface. This complexity must be balanced with robust security practices to prevent exploitation.
• Ecosystem Dependencies. Both vulnerabilities highlight the risks associated with ecosystem dependencies, whether in the form of mining software (OneZeroMiner or BZMiner) or ability to emulate fake GPUs by using the process of a vGPU. These dependencies require ongoing scrutiny and management.
• Community Trust. Handling of these incidents has significantly impacted community trust in DNX. Transparency, timely communication and effective mitigation are essential to maintaining users’ confidence. New procedures have been put in place to further help with communication and transparency going forward.
• Regulatory and Industry Impact. High-profile vulnerabilities could attract regulatory scrutiny or undermine DNX’s long-term goals.

3.2 Recommendations from Dynex Developers

To address these vulnerabilities and prevent future issues, the Dynex Developers have considered and taken actions according to the following recommendations:

Comprehensive Security Audits

A third-party security audit of the DynexSolve source code, by the reputable firm Cyberscope was requested and completed on 27th Jan 2025.

A detailed report of the audit findings to enhance transparency and community trust on both DNX and 0xDNX has already been published. This is available via the Audit firms’ websites, as well as on Dynex’s Website.

Algorithm Hardening

Additional validation checks, such as further refinements in the mechanism for initiation of the algorithm, were implemented in the PoUW algorithm to prevent bypasses. This includes additional measurements to further validate solutions being returned and to identify any possible “spoofing” of solutions. The resulted DynexSolve 2.4 is closer in line with the ultimate end goal of a totally unified PoUW algorithm, allowing for the complete removal of CryptoNight hashing at a next step.

Incident Response

While DNX is an ever-evolving ecosystem, the Dynex Developers recognise the need to develop a formalized incident response plan, including predefined communication channels, timelines for patch deployment and community engagement strategies.

Dynex Developers need to ensure that critical updates are deployed rapidly, ideally within 48 hours of a vulnerability being disclosed to the team. This will be able to bring more trust that the team is being proactive rather than reactive to the vulnerability being disclosed.

Community Engagement

Dynex Developers need to maintain open and transparent communication with the community through regular updates, AMAs and detailed post-mortems of security incidents (like this report). This will help rebuild the trust of our community and further strengthen the ecosystem.

Conclusion

• The DynexSolve 2.3 GPU Driver Stack Exploit represent challenges to the DNX ecosystem, highlighting the need for robust security practices in both algorithmic design and software implementation.
• While the Dynex Developers have taken steps to address these vulnerabilities, ongoing vigilance, transparency and community engagement are essential to restoring trust and ensuring the long-term success of the project.
• By implementing these new security options, the Dynex Developers can strengthen security of its ecosystem, mitigate future risks and position itself as a leader in the PoUW space. The update of algorithm to DynexSolve 2.4 also allows the team to take the next step, which is removing CryptoNight hashing completely and using PoUW for hashing.
• Miners, meanwhile, must take proactive steps to keep their systems updated and stay informed about ongoing developments.
• The DNX community is encouraged to collaborate in addressing these challenges, sharing insights and contributing to a more secure and resilient network. Together, we can overcome these setbacks and build a stronger, more trustworthy DNX ecosystem.

Timeline of Events

December 2024

Monitoring the network hashrate and comparing it with the hashrate of the devfee wallets for OneZeroMiner and BZminer, we realized something didn’t add up. So, we started investigating, monitoring closely and documenting mining wallets and their activities.

January 2025

First deprecation of old miner versions, still monitoring and investigating closely. We also received tips from a few community members which were valuable in finding out what methods were possibly used by cheaters. In conversation with miner devs, leadership team and doing continuous testing to try to confirm that the found suspected wallets are not producing solutions as they should, which none of them were.

February 2025

We got more tips from community members and through testing we’re closing in on the exploit method preferred by the cheaters. Still monitoring, researching and documenting network changes and suspected wallets. Pool updates were also pushed, so as to have them support changes in the network. Also working with miner devs to get new versions of their miners developed that will be hardened against the kind of exploit we’ve uncovered.

March 2025

OZM finished his update. Final deprecation of old miners performed and all cheaters were finally removed from the network.

ADDENDUM

Known Attacker(s) Wallets:

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XwnyoWH6tBAXtnm5K6mvo9JaU9gY71zZRY91aWFKxXzMhsZDZs5w97eU4qHkLNYgusMb8MKjhW2nSZ2P9cfmSs4C2ek1uk7Te

XwnGHULhuikfkGhHEieGkQC8W52GuSDXtbcC3bihcs7WX9hhPAnzGkh2wPzbEPHvCfSx3jA6H2H7CXAnZHM7Snwa2wbqNRBHY

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XwnR41DXCijPiPPD2sjQ81BdMp131qKp7bMAgViucFV1ANx3Wsw63TnjEnPBo4DdkYE6sVCqGQX8TCpizhg98JaY2GB8vL6EC

XwnsAJvjNZEL9rzA2AWcPg612A1C5AEiDYfxsvsgS6RYYU3adRMnradNN2AMKzMHuA4wS875PbKYzGD6JybHxhKU32qFGXLwC

XwnsxM15ZbAitv7Ch5u4m1Fowed4LZL6T3ML9d4GGRhtYKQpnXTcRzbTwZATkVjjRkEc6hjzpqMM1hSbyyUtkMRS2FAjavwF3

XwnbQ2D9MQMHFWup12STKedPTDJiRyTAG2m7NFXDsoLzDDhUke5hDmmARiNAD1Z3HD1jx7ZWfAJ82fthWpC2kJ3L1dnhRevEM

XwocTnPfCnDSHuBiAJ4M3E1APpGN7q3CHaRQG45DRtSu41jLoj2vW1bHh4pKVNCenE5ku4M3wpMQcSvKH8mMLToe1evVcRRwD

XwnTGzVp5LyUEfzzZRjPSnFuV1F6Yyjh85NXXoVpchU1ShxxxVjMxwKgE2ZQ4QVTefD6W1vPYzf6Ybn9V1JRejJr28vSA13uk

XwmjyLR54Cx9rjJp4xXKQmdDd9dnUmUyX12Hr2srFgiphm1My2xsFX1XC5WbJkk5wV5K8ZbeJ9Aqr1c5asLiBT5M1hXx2PPwF

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XwnTjKituD5iiBwi5yWdi58VySVsFBkRuUKY9qZkH3v8VTkq4bVcvFpezU1X7jKuDQYto3mQvfuPtR1QoxnVpRR11ZZrCBYpV

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XwoCu7TtkBLSCq2XBya2qpSCp7YPrcHaaUGNKo2JteNn3JT2ne2LgFWD3WZDG9udeai4xmcgUucvuLVHbzNNDhZB1tmqvB8uX

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Linked Exchange Wallets:

XwnJN1Ktf957HBXNEDhswcBgbsgjwFwDZjK9bmWqeEsZRwp2NztofQySXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5KKHUU6

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XwnobgSkHx8TmAXAyzQ9ddGEJqRKFMz4vgpuovWQbsVC8se3nsDT4WySXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5Hf4iCs

Xwn7mp3T53nBKs4Pnf7JWnURuw4fi6ygJbe4Gz1mX4VFWPjCpY9YwNuSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5HfYLZS

Xwo9sQ5D8KDUCTSLxfhGCpE6h1a1UC6mmCRp2bHBcKzha5aBQsSVPx9SXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5JMQaDy

XwmxbArhi7zgghhnjAsEMngDQQPvkbzCoReXKdMx4R8oPgWANGXDCvRSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5L2nRtM

XwokB13PFdfFgPjhHp4s23VkofN9iKKD6aPENqh2BbYsA8rUAN7Zcs7SXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5LDMsXa

XwnzSvykwSqdiNn2d76mHXQDqrP9hRTMqCvyGE8BJdVz7PzhotxMurmSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5HsTJr3

XwnNyuwE1v6D1oW8ioS584UB6XpUfoifBAgFFu6aMuwBAxLVFuFiv4VSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5MVVsuc

XwmpCFpAafHghZHiRJucEDVcSRpSGxginfgohxuQUhdbWfo8ZZZqWR3SXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5NTpVbq

XwnyzJc6QvaMAZ8RXVpCQrhXXZZLixfvjTNaEfQrhArDfUFPD3x1vZbSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5L6R5v6

Xwn6XiqqErte4a6YtsxSc8Q7YwW6a5rYdBacUkZdPbPthnD6rhuSXnuSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5HwjHco

Xwnu84r99Wti3ibk2PcappUWgLqqzfJVsCrT9Zs2RAJnKbtDyrtkyAMSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5M1tvS4

XwmpyGKELCvifxVrHAsep8cxxCEHKFGxDJ4xTf2mPXCpKzxmcu4t5aMSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5HWLTu8

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Xwnr8MFAtSq8D1sACAUTmBVf9DsWDXC77YXCkAJHadRZTfyBQJuJopZSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5JsCXXj

XwnkuNJAnibNNz1KsgEDs9ReFEdePMPEUb3XWw1PEuQvcvsbTJA8u2uSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5KnFreZ

Xwn3dkgpLMGj4a7RRi2pfbErGUvDTBBB6CeXVnLznAUjaLqx4cnRimTSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5P9gXvK

XwmzJ94ooks5Uz19wivbvLaesZ99MdVtXFvUmnq9Y54m6LVSvLJXXufSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5NFFYe8

Xwo9WDbCZWo6gi3DKWqaVtMR2bULUHtz1GDHyjZD55YzN8CUHFFWLPwSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5JJbrpM

XwmxAZnZ87zQHwCffjvY7tif9kh1MMUcU79CHwgfnjL77xtWuMPTNzySXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5HdvP45

XwnGH82N5S8YkCpGCW6QK1BDhENCJUJkrE1meRGXmTtnCjG6MkHXxfXSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5PLGwfU

XwnfPatUcQqgVgTXC2BUJsd3pfDMubwiNFZRssYGSbRT4Ae66w1u3WDSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5K65G15

Xwn7q5SFfnCNTQ4KCtFegS5s3vZgkZFmwVe4VD9yqpviAss8ZCeEmxhSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5Jeohwn

Xwo9UTnBhhZ7PoQttZX7R1AcHu22BDB5jAjGBv82fUy1AtatgjkwBsjSXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5KA4Fr1

XwoU65S6dNm3Do6p5kmGzATJt94FKnbbEDNjv6gphcGKi4covZeAMD7SXm5od82cJn3bUe7R81Ww5UwWwUcGbm6G2p5NNMVDk

Xwn7qYEan1RQLEg8wmWAEJXJzDgxT8Z1sNiLns258fcME2Gx5vE6N7QggpTKeVxF2fCquHN2HQQA8KWAeTyM9Vzb1nAA4Vrbj

(Gate.io wallet) + PaymentID:

• 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000de7776dbf41589
• 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000de748dedc5ea37
• 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000029499ca227fb57
• 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009853c451ef9ab7
• 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000288c09a0724007

Notes & Additional Information

While these wallet addresses have been confirmed to mine without doing the required compute work, it is worth noting that the list may contain errors due to the number of participating wallets. Speaking of the number of addresses, it is also worth noting that some cheaters used a lot of different mining wallets and possibly several exchange accounts in an effort to try and “fly under the radar”. The most notable example is one cheater who used over 40 mining addresses on EKApool but sent all DNX through proxy wallets to the exact same account on an exchange.

Legal Notice

The Dynex development team reserves the right to pursue legal action against individuals or entities found to be engaging in fraudulent activity or exploiting the network in violation of applicable laws or the platform’s terms of use.

Contributions

• Y3TI
• Sumitomo
• Dynex Development Team
• uhlik
• EhssanD (OneZeroMiner)
• iedoc (BZminer)
• Maximilian
• nostalgia
• PsyNetCrypt
• Отец Сергий (GMND)
• Rehberyal
• Scherm